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Component-based software engineering is a practical approach to address the is-
sue of building large software by combining existing and new components. However,
building reliable software systems from components requires to verify the consistency
of components and the correctness of their assemblies. In this context we proposed an
abstract and formal model, named Kmelia [1,2], with an associated language to specify
components, their provided and required services and their assemblies; we also devel-
oped a framework named COSTO [3] and re-used some verification tools [1,4] to study
the Kmelia specifications.
A Kmelia component is equipped with invariants and with pre/post-conditions de-
fined on services. A Kmelia assembly defines a set of links between required and pro-
vided services of various components, with respect to their pre/post-conditions. Our
main concern is to establish the correctness of Kmelia components and their assem-
blies. Among the formal analysis necessary to ensure complete correctness, we con-
sider: (i) the component invariant consistency vs. pre-/post-conditions of services; (ii)
the Kmelia assembly link contract correctness, that relates services which are linked
in the assemblies. We use the notion of contract as in the classical works and results
such as design-by-contract [5] or specification matching [6]: on the one hand the pre-
condition of a required service is stronger than the pre-condition of the linked provided
service; on the other hand the post-condition of the provided service is stronger than
the post-condition of the linked required service. This motivates the choice for using
Event-B and the Rodin framework to check the consistency of Kmelia components and
the correctness of their assembly contracts, by discharging generated proof obligations.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the necessary Event-B models, generated from parts
of the Kmelia specifications we want to verify. We design Event-B patterns to guide the
translation and build the necessary proof obligations.
In order to verify the Kmelia invariant consistency rules, we systematically build
appropriate Event-B models, by translating the necessary Kmelia elements in such a
way that the Event-B proof obligations (POs) correspond to the specific rules we needed
to check at the Kmelia level. Three kinds of Event-B models are to be extracted:
– a first Event-B model C_obs corresponds to the observable part of the Kmelia com-
ponent ;
– another Event-B model (C) is built as a refinement of the previous one C_obs to
consider the whole component, not only its observable part;
– for each required service, an Event-B model A_servR is built.
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Fig. 1. Event-B Extraction patterns
We describe how the proofs of the Event-B models are linked with the attempted proofs
at the Kmelia level. As an illustration, consider the generated POs about the invariant
preservation [7] by the event serv_obs:
o ∈ To ∧ inv(o) ∧ r ∈ Tres ∧ p ∈ Tp
∧ pre(p,o) ∧ post (p,o,o ’, r ’)
⇒ o’ ∈ To ∧ inv(o’) ∧ r ’ ∈ Tres
This corresponds exactly to the intended invariant consistency of the observable part at
the Kmelia level.
For each assembly link between a required service servR and a provided one serv,
we build an Event-B model as a refinement of the Event-B model previously gener-
ated for the required service servR. The observable variables of the provided service
are added and the invariant is completed with the mapping MAP(v,o). Then Event-B
refinement proof obligations are generated and discharged:
1. Invariant preservation
v ∈ Tv ∧ inv(v) ∧ res ∈ Tres ∧
o ∈ To ∧ inv(o) ∧MAP(v,o) ∧ ∀ q . ( q∈Tp ∧ preR(q,v) ⇒ pre(q,o) )
p ∈ Tp ∧ preR(p,v) ∧
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post (p,o,o ’, r ’) ∧MAP(v’,o’)
⇒
o’ ∈ To ∧ inv(o’) ∧MAP(v’,o’) ∧ ∀ q . ( q∈Tp ∧ preR(q,v’) ⇒ pre(q,o’) )
With an ∧-elimination, we consider ∀q. (q∈Tp ∧ preR(q,v’) ⇒ pre(q,o ’)) in the
right hand side. Then, the use of p ∈ Tp ∧ preR(p,v) in the left hand side, com-
bined with MAP(v’,o’) enables us to conclude that pre(q,o’) holds.
2. Action simulation
v ∈ Tv ∧ inv(v) ∧ res ∈ Tres ∧
o ∈ To ∧ inv(o) ∧MAP(v,o) ∧ ∀ q . ( q∈Tp ∧ preR(q,v) ⇒ pre(q,o) )
p ∈ Tp ∧ preR(p,v) ∧
post (p,o,o ’, r ’) ∧MAP(v’,o’)
⇒
∃ v ’. postR(p,v,v ’, r ’)
These POs establish the Kmelia assembly link contract correctness rules.
The refinement technique of Event-B is used to manage both the structuring of the
generated Event-B models and also the proofs to be discharged. Yet we have applied the
technique to small and medium size case studies. Using classical B to validate compo-
nents assembly contracts has been investigated in [8]. Our approach is quite similar with
respect to the use of the refinement to check the assembly, but we start from complete
component descriptions and target Event-B to prove properties. Compared with exist-
ing works, our work contributes at the level of correct-by-construction components and
also at the level of the consistency of component assemblies. The results of the current
work constitute one more step for rigorously building components and assemblies using
the Kmelia framework.
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